I have known Tan Sri Kadir Mohamad, the former KSU (the equivalent of our permanent secretary) of Wisma Putra, for more than 30 years. We first met in 1984 when he was the deputy chief of mission at the Malaysian Embassy in Washington, DC and I was a newly minted first secretary at our embassy.
In the subsequent decades our paths often crossed - the world of South-east Asian diplomacy is not large and Malaysia is our closest neighbour - and on occasion I worked with him in Asean and on some bilateral matters. So when I heard that he had written a book on Malaysia-Singapore relations, I hastened to procure a copy.
The content was as I expected: a very journeyman-like effort. There were no significant errors of fact on bilateral issues that I could detect. Mr Kadir is nothing if not a consummate professional, and contrary to popular belief, good diplomats of every country generally tell the truth and stick to the facts, although there is no obligation to always tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
In any case, all the most important facts have long been placed in the public domain, mainly by Singapore in answers to parliamentary questions or by the release of documents on water talks more than a decade ago. A reader expecting dramatic new revelations will be disappointed.
Mr Kadir's interpretations of the facts are of course different from the interpretations that I or other Singapore diplomats would have placed on the same facts. But that is only to be expected, and I am not inclined to quibble with him.
A different interpretation cannot change the most important fact of all: On almost every bilateral issue the book deals with - water, Pedra Blanca, the bridge and land reclamation - the outcome was not one that Malaysia had set out to achieve.
Diplomats try to promote their countries' interests. So it is entirely understandable that in the twilight of his career, a distinguished Malaysian diplomat would want to place his version of events on the record and vent a little. It would be churlish to deny him even this satisfaction.
I will only take issue with his conclusion, encapsulated in the title of his book and the thread running through it, that it has been "Fifty Years Of Contentions". Of course, Malaysian and Singapore interests often clashed. Relations between neighbours are always more complicated than relations between distant countries. But the interests of our countries have at least as often coincided.
Diplomacy is not, or at least ought not to be, a zero-sum game. Nor should any one aspect of any relationship be allowed to colour the entire relationship.
Although we contended over bilateral matters, Malaysia and Singapore have simultaneously worked together very well on other issues, for example as we did in Asean and the United Nations during the decade-long struggle in the 1980s - which coincided with some tense episodes in bilateral relations - to prevent a fait accompli in Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia. We still cooperate closely in Asean.
And even when the outcome of bilateral contentions was in Singapore's favour, Malaysian interests were not irrevocably hurt. The 2010 agreement on the implementation of the 1990 Points of Agreement on railway land was beneficial to both countries. Malaysia still buys cheap processed water from Singapore.
Mr Kadir's failure to give sufficient recognition to the cooperative aspect of bilateral relations is, I think, due to the over-emphasis he places on what he describes as Mr Lee Kuan Yew's "baggage full of bitterness and a heart filled with anger" over Separation. He describes his book as "…the story of how one man dictated the form and substance of relations…"
Separation was of course a traumatic event for both countries that did indeed shape and set in motion the essential dynamic of Malaysia-Singapore relations. But not in the way Mr Kadir thinks it did.
He places far too much emphasis on the personal element. It is undeniable that Mr Lee was a dominant personality in Singapore politics and policymaking for many years. But I suspect that in trying to understand Singapore, Mr Kadir looked in a Malaysian mirror and saw Dr Mahathir Mohamad.
Both were dominant personalities in the government and politics of their respective countries but not in entirely the same way.
Far more than Dr Mahathir, Mr Lee worked within and respected the Cabinet system. Mr Lee was acutely aware that any agreement he reached with Malaysia had to outlast his tenure in political office and even his lifetime and therefore sought collective agreement.
By contrast, even after he retired as prime minister, Dr Mahathir attempted to influence the way his successors dealt with Singapore on bilateral issues when he did not agree with them. Many Malaysians certainly believe he tries to influence Malaysian domestic politics and policies to this day.
And the metaphor of "baggage" used by Mr Kadir and others is a singularly inappropriate - and simplistic - way to try and understand the complex dynamic of bilateral relations set in motion by Separation. "Baggage" connotes something that is carried by an individual or a group of individuals and which can be jettisoned or changed if necessary. The implication is that if this does not occur, it is only because those individuals are unwilling to do so or have been prevented from doing so. And Mr Kadir argues, or at least strongly implies, that this was what in fact Mr Lee did.
But the reason for Separation, or rather the reason why, as Mr Kadir bluntly and perhaps less euphemistically argues in his first chapter, "it was necessary to expel Singapore" goes far beyond individual personalities.
Singapore is organised on the basis of multiracial meritocracy. Malaysia is organised on the principle, politely described in Article 153 of its Constitution as "the special position of the Malays", but more popularly and politically potently understood as "Ketuanan Melayu".
Time has eased the sharp edges of Separation, and time will certainly ease them further. But it is difficult to conceive of either Singapore or Malaysia discarding their respective fundamental organising principles. They are embedded in our societies and political systems, not by the will or whim of any individual, however powerful, but by the collective choice of the majority in both countries.
There are of course Singaporeans who do not agree with the Government and some do not like Mr Lee. Some Singaporeans may well already have only the vaguest of notions of who Mr Lee is and what he has done. But I have yet to meet any serious-minded Singaporean who really wants to abandon our fundamental organising principle and adopt something akin to the Malaysian system.
Nor can I imagine Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution ever being repealed. We may have been once one country, but are now and for evermore two countries. The existential tension between two countries organised on fundamentally irreconcilable political principles that defines the dynamic of Malaysia-Singapore relations is not going to go away and so must be managed and is being managed.
Once this is understood, a balanced and holistic view of Malaysia-Singapore relations becomes possible. It is a relationship based, like every other interstate relationship throughout history, on national interests, some of which will converge and some of which will diverge.
The complications in Malaysia-Singapore relations are the inevitable ones of proximity and an entangled history. They have some special characteristics, but that is in general not particularly unusual between neighbours anywhere. Every close relationship has its own special characteristics.
It is the purpose of diplomacy to broaden the area of convergence between national interests whenever possible and manage the tensions when interests diverge. That Singapore and Malaysian diplomats - Mr Kadir included - have succeeded in doing so at least as often as we have failed should not be overlooked.
Even if Mr Kadir is right that "the bitterness and anger towards Malaysian leaders that engulfed Lee Kuan Yew on 9 August 1965 … remains with him until this day" - and I think Mr Kadir is profoundly mistaken, entirely misreads Mr Lee, and may well be unconsciously projecting some of his own attitudes onto him - it did not prevent Mr Lee from concluding what was, until the 2010 railway land agreement, the most important Malaysia-Singapore agreement: The 1990 Linggiu Dam agreement.
In his speech at the launch of Mr Kadir's book, former prime minister Abdullah Badawi cut to the core when he said Malaysia cannot blame Singapore entirely for bilateral problems, but "… must also look at ourselves in the mirror". Good advice.
The writer, a former permanent secretary for foreign affairs, is now ambassador-at-large.
NST/nst
.jpg)
.jpg)
Tiada ulasan:
Catat Ulasan